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UNTANGLING INFINITE REGRESS AND THE ORIGINS OF CAPABILITY 
 
ABSTRACT 
We argue that strategic management in general—and capability theory in particular—suffers 
from problems of infinite regress that can be traced to an unsatisfactory specification of 
initial conditions. We argue, first, that this has led to an overemphasis on path-dependence, 
experience and history, without sufficient attention on initial conditions: more proximate, 
decision-oriented punctuation points that can be used for better theoretical explanation. 
Second, we show how the initial conditions of theories are often not distinctively different 
from what is being explained, which prevents theory from providing credible specifications 
of causal mechanisms. Third, we highlight how the regress problem has led to a relatively 
casual borrowing of concepts from neighboring disciplines, which has created a mismatch 
between the aims of management theory and relevance to practice. We suggest research 
heuristics for how to deal with infinite regress problems, to develop more rigorous and 
relevant theories of capability and strategic management. 
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“It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now 
whatever is in motion is put in motion by another […] If that by which it is put in motion be 
itself put in motion, then this also must needs to be put in motion by another, and that by 
another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, 
and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as 
they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion 
by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; 
and this everyone understands to be God.”  
 
(St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Pt. 1 Q. 2 Art. 3)  
 
As noted by Porter, “any theory of strategy must grapple with how far back in the chain of causality 
to go” (1991, p. 99). For example, if a firm is said to possess some advantage-conferring resource or 
capability, then this raises immediate questions about how that resource or capability was secured in 
the first place (Barney, 1986; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). Thus questions about the origins of capability 
can quickly lead to the so-called problem of “infinite regress” (Arend, 2015; Collis, 1994; Winter, 
2003). A common example of this infinite regress problem is illustrated by the argument that 
organizations are constituted by basic, “static” or “zero-order” capabilities, and that these in turn are 
modified by “dynamic,” higher or nth order capabilities (Winter, 2003, p. 992). But as noted by 
Winter (2003), this leads to an infinite regress where it is hard to pinpoint the origins of capability in 
terms of some ever-higher, nth level of dynamic capability: from “learning” to “learning to learn” to 
“learning to learn to learn.”1 Or put differently, infinite regress problems can thus lead to a reductio 
ad absurdum where the search for origins leads the field to, in effect, “start with the Big Bang” (Foss, 
Heimeriks, Winter & Zollo, 2012, p. 117). 
While the infinite regress problem is likely to be relevant across many areas of management 
research, the problem appears to be particularly severe in the case of organizational capabilities (e.g. 
Jacobides & Winter, 2012; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2012; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A relevant argument here is that advantages in fact might increasingly be short-lived rather than meaningfully 
sustainable in the long run (Wiggins and Ruefli, 2002; Wiggins and Ruefli, 2005). That is, the idea of infinite 
regress might simply reflect the ongoing “arms race” (or “Red Queen” effect: Kauffman, 1995) where just 
staying in place requires increasingly more effort, as the practices associated with competitive advantage 
diffuse.	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Zollo & Winter, 2002).2 First, the broad and teleological nature of the concept not only includes a 
large number of very different explanatory aims and dependent variables (e.g., competitive 
advantage, learning, replication, firm survival, etc), but more importantly it also opens up a multitude 
of possible explanatory factors (independent variables) that may range across fundamentally different 
levels of analysis, temporal frames of reference, academic disciplines, and explanatory priorities. 
Hence, the broad and inclusive nature of the capabilities concept—as we will discuss—provides few, 
natural punctuation points for stopping a potential infinite regress. Second, the concept of 
organizational capability is strongly linked to evolutionary and historical approaches (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982), which naturally raise many infinite regress-related issues about how far into the 
history of an organization we should pry when searching for the origins of capability (Winter, 2011). 
Putting too much emphasis on historical factors such as path-dependence risks leading to an infinite 
regress where factors at t0 are just imported from t-1 and so on, all the way to, say, the manager’s 
DNA or the proverbial Big Bang. This is particularly problematic with the strong emphasis placed on 
experience as a source of capabilities (cf. Anand et al., 2015).  
Infinite regress needs to be halted or punctuated at the right point to allow for explanations that 
generate useful predictions, credible causal mechanisms, and relevance in the eyes of the target 
audience. Building on the case of the capability literature in strategy, we argue that management 
theory in general, and capability theory in particular, suffers from problems of infinite regress that 
can be traced to an unsatisfactory specification of initial conditions. First, initial conditions typically 
do not feature proximate and decision-oriented punctuation points that can be used to derive useful 
predictions—specifically due to an overemphasis on independent variables and factors such as path-
dependence, serendipity, experience and history. Second, initial conditions are in many cases not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Organizational capabilities are defined as ”the ability of an organization to perform a coordinated set of tasks, 
utilizing organizational resources, for the purpose of achieving a particular end result” (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003, 
p. 999). There are two types of organizational capabilities: Operational capabilities are defined as “a high-level 
routine (or collection of routines) that together with its implementing input flows, confers upon an 
organization’s management a set of decision options for producing significant outputs of a particular type” 
(Winter, 2000, p. 983). Routines, in this context, refer to a “repetitive pattern of activity” (Nelson & Winter, 
1982, p. 97). Dynamic capabilities are defined as the “ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and 
external competences to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece et al, 1997, p. 516).                    
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distinctively different from what is being explained, which prevents theory from providing a full and 
credible specification of causal mechanisms. Third, due to the common practice of importing 
assumptions and concepts from neighboring disciplines, initial conditions are often not matched with 
the unique explanatory aim of management theory, which leaves the theory less relevant to the 
targeted audience.  
Infinite regress problems thus represent a central meta-theoretical issue that deserves explicit 
attention. In fact, infinite regress issues lurk behind any theoretical argument or empirical analysis in 
management. However, while infinite regress issues—more often than not—remain implicit, we aim 
to make these matters more explicit by outlining the different forms that infinite regress problems and 
their solutions typically take in the field of strategy. The purpose of our analysis is both to highlight 
strengths and weaknesses in prior work (explicitly or implicitly) dealing with infinite regress, and to 
offer concrete advice on future theory development, particularly as it relates to the concept of 
capabilities.  
Our essay is organized as follows. The next section highlights the specific forms that infinite 
regress can take, using the literature on organizational capabilities as our example. In addition to the 
well-known nth-order regress problem associated with dynamic capabilities, we suggest that the 
infinite regress problem can also take on two additional forms: experiential regress and hierarchical 
regress. While the three forms are related, and difficult to clearly separate, they also feature unique 
characteristics and considerations that have not been distinguished in the literature on capabilities. 
The third section outlines and illustrates three ways by which strategy researchers might deal with 
infinite regress problems: a pragmatic approach (making a simplifying assumption to ease the 
construction of the theory), an application domain approach (cutting off the chain of explanatory 
factors at commonly accepted disciplinary boundaries), and a so-called real origin approach 
(identifying the “fundamental” or “real” origin of a capability). We conclude by offering three 
research heuristics for future theory development, which also summarize the concrete implications of 
our analysis.  
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THE INFINITE REGRESS PROBLEM AND CAPABILITIES 
The infinite regress problem represents a general philosophical issue that has been raised in a number 
of disciplines, including physics and philosophy (van Fraassen, 1992). The central question is where 
scientific explanation should stop or start. In the sciences this has led to the postulation of a hierarchy 
of disciplines (Oppenheim & Putnam, 1958), where eventually all higher social explanations 
somehow yield to more reductionist factors associated with disciplines such as biology, chemistry 
and physics (Schaffer, 2003)—and even the very beginnings of time. Of course, taken to it’s extreme, 
these types of arguments would suggest that the world itself is highly path-dependent and 
deterministic, originating, in its current manifestations and forms, from initial conditions that go back 
billions of years.   
While these arguments about infinite regress may seem far removed from theoretical or 
practical concerns, we highlight why infinite regress matters. Any theoretical or empirical paper 
implicitly makes claims about how they are solving the infinite regress problem by their choice of 
independent variables and the string of causal relationships or mechanisms included in their analysis. 
This is particularly evident with the concept of organizational or dynamic capabilities. Thus the 
notion of capabilities allows us to outline many of the more general challenges and opportunities for 
theory development related to infinite regress in strategy, and management research more broadly. As 
indicated above, the nth order infinite regress problem associated with organizational capabilities is 
already familiar to scholars from extant work (see Arend, 2015; Collis, 1994; Foss et al., 2012; 
Winter, 2003). Thus our focus next is on two additional forms of infinite regress that have been less 
acknowledged in the literature: experiential and hierarchical regress. These two forms, while linked to 
the nth order regress problem, are nonetheless also independent and thus warrant further attention.  
The identified infinite regress problems in research on capabilities and the different approaches 
to solving these problems are summarized in Table 1. 
---- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ---- 
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The Experiential Regress Problem 
Among the most common origins, explanations and even measures of capability is “experience.” 
Experiential models of capability focus on a range of similar constructs, such as the frequency of 
engaging in a particular activity (say, experience with M&As, alliancing, patenting, or new 
production introductions), path-dependence and history, repetition and iteration, and learning. For 
example, in their highly influential article on the origin of dynamic capabilities, Eisenhardt and 
Martin argue that capabilities are about “experiential processes”  (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000)—for 
example, experience in M&A activity, experience in R&D, and experience in internationalization 
(e.g., Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Haleblian et al., 2009; Hayward, 2002; Zollo & Reuer, 2010). 
These approaches typically build on the literature on organizational learning and experience curves 
(Argote, 1999; Levitt & March, 1988; Levinthal & March, 1993; Zollo & Winter, 2002). 
But experience or history-oriented explanations of capability raise immediate, infinite regress-
type questions about where this experience or history comes from in the first place. That is, if we say 
that an organization has developed a capability due to its “history” or “experience”—for example, the 
number of times it has, say, launched new products or engaged in M&A activity (Anand, Mulotte, & 
Ren, 2015)—then the immediate question is where that history and advantage-conferring experience 
came from (Felin & Foss, 2012): what decisions or initial conditions led to these experiences? The 
experience itself might be a so-called epiphenomenon, that is, a co-varying factor (or by-product) that 
may not strictly be causal and thus mask other, more fundamental factors that give rise to the 
capability.3  
This is best illustrated by focusing on the most popular measure of capability: the number of 
times an organization has engaged in an activity. As recently summarized by Anand et al., this 
“number of times” (or experience)-variable has been used as a key independent variable in a number 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 To provide a trivial example: we might say that an athlete who wins the gold medal in the 100m sprint event 
did so because of experience in running finals in the past, or even winning these finals. Though winning surely 
is largely an epiphenomenon in this context, where the capability itself is to be located in other factors (e.g., 
training by the athlete, coaching, ability or talent). 	  
	   8 
of contexts in management, including “new production introductions, diversification moves, 
international expansions, alliances, and acquisitions” (2015, p. 2). Empirical research on capabilities 
uses counts of past events, actions or behaviors as the central independent variable for measuring 
capabilities. The field of evolutionary economics has influenced these experiential understandings of 
capability, by placing a strong emphasis on historical mechanisms (see Nelson & Winter, 1982; for 
more recent work, see Jacobides & Winter, 2012; Winter, 2012; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Particular 
emphasis is placed on behavioral patterns, such as routines, which lend themselves to historical 
analysis, and observation and operationalization. But explanations based on counts of past behavior, 
or appeals to experience and history, raise questions about how far back in history we ought to go in 
terms of explaining the history or experience itself. And more importantly, any appeal to a historical 
or experiential antecedent raises questions about the respective origins of that history: when, why and 
how was the organization able to engage in that activity in the first place? Thus, as stated by Winter, 
“the origin of today’s organizational routines and capabilities lies in the past, along with the origins 
of the Constitution of the United States, the Earth, and the element carbon” (2011, p. 10). Again, the 
problem then might be that experience is an epiphenomenon, that is, endogenous to other factors 
(Anand et al., 2015; Felin & Foss, 2011).4   
The emphasis on experiential factors—and the associated problem of infinite regress—also ties 
into some fundamental, extant debates in the field of strategy, for example, the debate about the 
respective primacy of resource picking versus capability building as an origin of competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1986; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Makadok, 2001; Maritan & Peteraf, 2011). That is, 
are resources simply picked (or purchased) from the environment (factor markets) or are they 
internally developed? And, where do advantage-conferring resources then come from in the first 
place? The literature on resources and capabilities has settled on the underlying “endowment” of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The idea of endogeneity has of course been discussed in terms of its methodological and empirical importance 
to ensure that scholars properly identify the underlying selection and treatment effects in their models 
(Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003). Our point in emphasizing the endogeneity of capability is that there are also 
important theoretical considerations, particularly when capabilities-based work focuses heavily on historical 
and experiential factors that may have endogenous origins related to the nature of the entrepreneurs, managers 
and firms involved (Felin, 2012). 
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resources that a particular firm happens to already possess (Leiblein, 2011), as resources purchased in 
factor markets may be unlikely to create value, as their cost will exceed their rent-generating 
capacity, if markets are efficient (though, see Felin, Kauffman, Mastrogiorgio & Mastrogiorgio, 
2016).  
The literature on capability building typically emphasizes the temporal, experiential, 
serendipitous and path-dependent nature of building capabilities (e.g., Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003; 
Winter, 2012). The idea of capability building can be summarized by saying that “history matters” 
(Winter, 2012), or put differently, that organizations and capability development are path dependent 
(cf. Sydow & Schreyogg, 2009). The research on “capability development trajectories” similarly 
places emphasis on path-dependence and the scale of experience (e.g., Helfat & Peteraf, 2009; 
Rockart & Dutt, 2015). The history of the organization represents an accumulation of the various 
decisions, initial conditions, experiences and contexts that shape the trajectory, behavior, capability 
development and performance of a firm (e.g., Aldrich, 2006).  
However, the accumulated history of activities and experiences—the antecedents of capability 
building—surely is also initiated or punctuated by managerial or entrepreneurial decisions that enable 
or provide the endogenous antecedents of those histories and experiences. Thus some have focused 
on managerial capabilities and decisions (Castanias & Helfat, 1991, 2001), and more recently on 
cognition (cf. Gavetti, 2005; also see Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). But again, citing experiential and 
historical factors as central for capability development raises important questions about origins, and 
the forces that can break, interrupt or intervene in a seemingly path-dependent, or even deterministic, 
historical process. Thus there are important questions about the role of entrepreneurs, managers and 
firms in shaping the resources and the set of activities that a particular firm chooses to engage in (i.e., 
resource picking). The central issue is that focusing on counts or observations of particular activities 
and experiences over time does not tell us why or how a firm, or entrepreneur or manager, decided (or 
had the capability) to engage in that activity in the first place. Here strategy scholars typically invoke 
some form of non-coincidental superior information (e.g., Barney, 1986), or serendipity (Denrell et 
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al., 2003). But even the origin of such superior information has to be accounted for in order to avoid 
the regress problem.  
The Hierarchical Regress Problem 
Another form of regress has to do with hierarchical levels of analysis. The hierarchical regress 
problem is different from the experiential regress in that it does not primarily involve regress along 
the dimension of time but rather towards ever higher or lower levels or units of analysis (e.g., 
regressing from a system level explanation to a subsystem explanation). That is, if we say that an 
organization has a specific capability (in fact, capabilities are most often explicitly defined as 
“collective” constructs: see Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Zollo & Winter, 2002), 
then the immediate question may be whether this capability originates from higher or lower levels of 
analysis. In other words, when we say that the firm or organization itself, as a social collective, 
“houses” or is the locus of capability, then we can further push for the origins of that capability 
hierarchically upwards to look at the industry, network, community or even society—or downwards 
toward teams and individuals. Capabilities may be seen as originating from the industry or network 
that a firm is a part of (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998; Kogut, 2000), or they may be seen as originating 
from the nature of the individuals that constitute the organization (e.g., Castanias & Helfat, 1991; 
Felin & Foss, 2005).  
While there undoubtedly is some truth to both approaches, the central question is whether 
“regressing” upwards or downwards will give us better and more parsimonious theoretical 
explanations of capability. This question has in fact led to heated debates between those who 
advocate methodological individualism versus those who advocate methodological collectivism when 
it comes to explaining capabilities (e.g., Barney & Felin, 2013; Henderson & Cockburn, 1996; 
Hodgson, 2012; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Spender, 1996; Winter, 2013). These debates can 
essentially be framed as disagreements about the preferred direction of hierarchical regress in the 
explanation of capabilities. For example, if individuals are the cause of organizational capability, then 
we can further press and inquire as to the origins of that individual capability itself: how did those 
individuals end up in the organization? And where did the individual capabilities originate from? 
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Capability-based explanations then can lead to the study of individual biographies, the background of 
employees, or perhaps even genetic DNA analysis. Evolutionary psychologists have of course tried to 
push higher-level explanations of phenomena in this fashion down to the level of individuals and 
genes and evolution. And in similar fashion, some in strategy have recently moved to study the 
lower-level, “neuro”-foundations of strategy and entrepreneurship (Holan, 2014; Laureiro-Martinez, 
Brusoni, Canessa & Zollo, 2014; Powell, 2011).  
But, beyond reduction to lower levels of analysis, hierarchical regress might also lead us to 
focus on higher levels of analysis. Some scholars have explicitly argued that the “locus” of capability 
and competitive advantage indeed lies at the level of inter-organizational relations and networks (see 
Dyer & Singh, 1998; Powell et al., 1996), rather than at the level of firms or individuals. The logic is 
that firms—let alone individuals—simply cannot house all the relevant knowledge needed for 
innovation and capability development (Kogut, 2000; also see Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Spender, 
1996), and therefore the central focal point and origin of capability must lie at higher levels, such as 
inter-organizational relations and networks. However, this logic of turning to ever-higher levels of 
analysis also suffers from a potential regress problem if no clear stopping point is provided for where 
this levels-related expansion of the explanation should end. Why just focus on networks—why not 
focus on higher levels such as society, the nation, or even the global economy? But pragmatically, if 
we say that alliances or networks are the source of capability and advantage, this raises questions 
about how and why those alliances were secured by the focal firm in the first place.  
There is also a risk that the very notion of firm boundaries (see Zenger et al., 2011), and thus 
also the notion of firm-level competitive advantage (see Coff, 1999; Peteraf & Barney, 2003), gets 
lost if we continue this regress to ever-higher levels of analysis. But clearly boundaries still matter 
(cf. Argyres et al., 2012). Furthermore, it simply can’t be assumed, as much of the literature does, that 
individuals in an organization or nodes of networks (at whatever level of analysis) are homogeneous 
(Felin & Hesterly, 2007). This is effectively what is done when prescribing that say, networks, rather 
than firms, are the central locus of capability. 
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Thus debates around the matter of hierarchical infinite regress mirror some of the discussions about 
the appropriate levels of analysis for studying organizational performance, for example, firm versus 
industry versus leadership/CEO effects (cf. Lieberson & O’Conner, 1972; McGahan & Porter, 1997; 
Rumelt, 1991).  
 
ADDRESSING THE INFINITE REGRESS PROBLEM 
We next outline three different ways through which infinite regress problems can be—and indeed, to 
a more limited extent, have been—addressed vis-à-vis understanding organizational capabilities: 1) a 
pragmatic approach, 2) an application domain approach, and 3) a real origin approach. To do this, we 
follow a stream of papers that build on philosophy of science to address theoretical problems in 
strategy (e.g., Durand, 2002; Foss & Hallberg, 2014; Powell, 2001, 2002, 2003; Tsang, 2006). We 
specifically build on existing research in the philosophy of science that addresses the role of 
assumptions in theory building (see Krajewski, 1977; Musgrave, 1981; Mäki, 2000; Nagel, 1961), 
which, as we will show, closely parallels central issues related to our discussion of infinite regress.  
Any theory uses assumptions to delineate the boundaries and space of the phenomena that it 
seeks to explain (explananda), along with the relevant explanatory factors (explanantia) (Dubin, 
1978; Krajewski, 1977; Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; Whetten, 1989; Lam, 2010; Mayer, 1999; Tsang, 
2006). Theories and models in management also rely on assumptions to delineate the phenomena to 
be explained—the dependent variable(s) of interest: for example, competitive advantage—as well as 
the central explanatory factors—or independent variables: for example, capabilities—and the causal 
mechanisms that link the two together. According to Musgrave (1981), these underlying assumptions 
take one of three different forms depending on their function. First, theorists use assumptions to 
abstract from certain factors that they believe to have a negligible effect on the explained 
phenomenon. In constructing models of reality theorists engage in conjectures about the relative 
importance of different sets explanantia (or independent variables) in order to exclude those factors 
that are thought to be of less significance (negligibility assumptions). Second, assumptions may also 
be used to specify the domain of application for a theory. Theories are about and focused on 
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something—a unique domain—such as individual behavior, the behavior of objects in space, or in the 
case of strategy, the heterogeneity and performance of organizations. While attempts of course have 
been made to generate universal or general theories, nonetheless theories usually need to delineate a 
specific and contingent space of application. Theorists introduce assumptions that both specify and 
delimit the application of the theory to a domain (domain assumption). And third, assumptions may 
be used as heuristic devices to temporarily simplify the development of theory. For example, imagine 
that a theorist realizes that a particular assumption does not hold in any of the relevant domains (e.g., 
perfect information, in the case of economics). Despite this, the theorist might choose to keep the 
assumption in order to simplify the explanation, make it more tractable, and allow for a gradual 
approximation of the true causal pattern as the theory in question matures (heuristic assumption). 
We argue that solutions to the infinite regress problem outlined above typically involve similar 
considerations as decisions of what type of assumptions to introduce when theorizing; that is, 
decisions about what aspects of the studied phenomena to abstract from, and those properties that can 
be treated in an idealized fashion. One can of course argue that theories should always, and without 
compromise, be realistic and provide a truthful account of origins and initial conditions of the 
explained phenomena (see Tsang, 2009). In the capability literature, as we will discuss, this is 
actually what we find to be dominant ambition. Although this line of reasoning has obvious merits as 
a long-term goal for theorizing, nonetheless when taken to its extreme it misses the crucial point that 
theory and models always and inevitably represent imperfect abstractions or idealizations of reality 
(Friedman, 1953; Musgrave, 1981; Mäki, 1994; Rasmusen, 1989). As aptly stated by Nelson and 
Winter,  
“theorists should aim to tell the truth in their theorizing, but they cannot aim to tell 
the whole truth. For to theorize is precisely to focus on those entities and 
relationships that are believed to be central to the phenomenon observed—and 
largely ignore the rest” (1982, p. 134).  
 
Theories thus can be seen as maps of reality. Theories, like maps, don’t represent the full 
reality itself. In fact, a “perfect” one-to-one map of reality, though very accurate, would be useless for 
practical purposes. Maps are only useful if they abstract away from reality and focus on central 
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aspects. Theorists are thus required to make tradeoffs between different elements of the theory being 
developed in order to further their explanatory aims, and to focus on the key elements and 
explanatory variables. Of course, some may argue that realism should have highest priority (Tsang, 
2006), and others may point to the merits of predictive power (Friedman, 1953; Shugan, 2007), and 
yet others point to the importance of furthering creative thinking and ways of raising novel research 
questions (Kuhn, 1998; Weick, 1995). Regardless of these priorities, theories tend to only be useful if 
they—in map-like fashion—are simple and focus on a few key elements rather than trying to 
somehow capture reality itself.  
Next we discuss three approaches to the infinite regress problem. We highlight first how 
infinite regress problems may be addressed pragmatically by simplifying, by developing heuristic 
assumptions about a theory’s initial conditions. We then discuss how domain assumptions may be 
used for application domain approaches that form discipline-based boundary conditions for a theory. 
And finally we discuss how negligibility assumptions can provide a core motivation for the real 
origin approach.  
The Pragmatic Approach to Infinite Regress 
One approach to the infinite regress problem involves specifying particular initial conditions that are 
pragmatic in terms of simplicity and theoretical tractability. Factors such as the research-related costs 
and the practical aspects or reliability of going back to reconstruct the histories of organizations 
(including, say, past decisions, events, employee backgrounds) often lead to compromises that drive 
scholars to accept more proximate causal stopping points for understanding the origins of capability 
and to focus on more recent history and more readily-available data.5 Theoretically the pragmatic 
approach to the infinite regress problem is perhaps most explicitly exemplified in transaction cost 
economics by the initial conditions stated by Oliver Williamson. Specifically, Williamson argues that 
for reasons of “expositional convenience,” he begins his analysis with the initial condition that “in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For example, scholars may only have access to certain types of data or organizations, which then drives the 
decision of where to start the analysis of organizational capability. The availability of specific data of course 
isn’t a very defensible approach to studying capabilities, though it undoubtedly plays some role in what strategy 
scholars have focused on (e.g., large public firms where financial performance data is readily available: 
Aldrich, 2006). 
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beginning there were markets” (1975, p. 20). While this initial condition and assumption is debatable 
(as criticized and discussed by Granovetter, 1985), it clearly constitutes an assumption that is made 
not necessarily to accurately depict the starting point of reality (or an actual historical chain of 
causally related events), but rather to provide the theory with an analytically clear and tractable initial 
condition and starting point that forms the foundation for further theorizing and prediction, 
specifically about the emergence of firms and organizational boundaries. In the words of Williamson, 
“the main reason for the statement of mine you quote [“in the beginning there were markets”] is that 
you’ve got to start the analysis somewhere. You could start with the neoclassical theory of markets 
and market failures and interpret hierarchies as a response to market failures. But a sociologist might 
start with hierarchies and hierarchical failures and interpret markets as a response to hierarchical 
failures” (Williamson in Hodgson & Gindis, 2007, p. 378).  
An important point here is that the existence of the dependent variable—in the case of the 
theory of the firm this dependent variable is the firm itself (Coase, 1937)—cannot simply be assumed 
but must instead be explained. Thus Williamson starts with markets, a different organizational form, 
and then in turn seeks to explain the emergence of the firm (or hierarchy), another organizational 
form. Resource-based logic similarly cannot simply assume that a firm already possesses the 
resources that might confer a competitive advantage—the very resources it should seek to explain—
as this doesn’t solve the infinite regress problem but only raises questions about where those 
resources came from in the first place. Thus some resource-based approaches focus on the 
identification, purchase (in factor markets), accumulation, and development of resources and 
capabilities. This exemplifies another form of pragmatics where theorists are willing to sacrifice the 
realism of the theory in terms of depicting an actual historical chain of events in order to gain 
theoretical tractability, parsimony, or to economize on scarce research related resources.  
It is worth noting that a significant part of the capability literature arguably breaks with the 
pattern found in transaction cost economics and the RBV (i.e., of initially assuming the opposite, or 
something distinctively different, of what the theory explains) by positing repetitive behavior, 
heterogeneity and capabilities all the way through the causal chain (cf. Jacobides & Winter, 2012). 
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The example of initial conditions in transaction cost economics raises questions about whether there 
are similar reasons for some of the formulations of initial conditions in capability theory (Argyres & 
Zenger, 2012). Statements, similar to that of Williamson (1975, p. 20), can in fact be found in 
seminal contributions to this literature. For example, Nelson and Winter state that “the idea that the 
immediate determinant of business behavior is ‘habitual reaction’ provides a useful starting point for 
evolutionary modeling” (1982, p. 142; also see Levitt & March, 1988). The focus on pragmatics and 
usefulness then provides one way to state initial conditions and start the analysis and theory 
development. 
Pragmatic approaches to addressing infinite regress-related problems can thus, as in transaction 
cost economics and evolutionary economics, be seen as operational in the literature on capabilities 
where, for example, hierarchies of nth order capabilities may provide a feasible (albeit abstract) 
answer to the question of where change originates from (see Collis, 1994; Helfat & Peteraf, 2011). 
Similarly, as highlighted by Collis (1994), a lexicographical ordering of capabilities at different levels 
provides an effective heuristic by which regress problems in nth levels of capability can be made 
tractable. But, the notion of levels of nth order capabilities can be too abstract for firms to readily 
invest in, though this intuition might broadly offer an interesting way of thinking about capability. 
The pragmatic approach is not only visible in the nth order regress problem but also in experiential 
and hierarchical regress. For example, theories of dynamic capability have been defended against 
accusations of being unclear—about the nature of key concepts and causal relationships—by pointing 
out that the theory is still “in its infancy” and thus should be given extra leeway as it matures (Helfat 
& Winter, 2009, p. 92). According to this approach, regress problems arising from unclear 
specification of the origin of capability may thus be dismissed until the theory is considered mature 
enough. 
The problem with pragmatics. The problems faced by the pragmatically oriented approach to 
infinite regress relate to the potential arbitrariness of initial conditions that this approach can give rise 
to. The selection of certain initial conditions for the sole purpose of “providing a starting point” (as 
suggested by Williamson above) or that particular initial conditions are “useful” for a given purpose, 
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of course does not guarantee that these conditions are in fact well suited for explaining phenomena 
beyond the narrow ones that the theorist had in mind when beginning the construction of the theory. 
Furthermore, it is not clear if the pragmatic solution to infinite regress and associated explanations 
will provide a satisfactory causal story that in a credible way accounts for the explained phenomenon. 
A good example is Friedman’s (1953) “as if” defense of rationality assumptions in economics, that is, 
the assumption that economic actors behave “as if” they are maximizing profits by equating marginal 
cost with marginal revenue. While such an assumption might be well suited for the practical purposes 
Friedman had in mind, for example predicting long-run market equilibria, it may be poorly suited for 
addressing many other phenomena, such as micro-level decision making processes or firm behavior. 
And, as discussed by others (e.g., Hayek, 1945), the strong god-like rationality assumption and focus 
of equilibrium of course tells us very little, if anything, about the underlying processes and dynamics 
associated with markets, such as the creation of value and the emergence of potential equilibria. 
Hence, adopting causal starting points based solely on apparent pragmatics, while useful in some 
instances, can also prove to have a substantial downside when theories seek to include new concepts 
and address new empirical phenomena that were not originally addressed by the theory. 
The Application Domain Approach to Infinite Regress  
A second approach to the infinite regress problem involves “cutting off” the chain of explanatory 
factors at a commonly accepted disciplinary boundary or empirical domain. By convention, theories 
and disciplines are often specifically developed to explain phenomena within some domain or 
boundary, for example at a certain level of analysis (e.g., individual or organization), while leaving 
phenomena within other domains and levels to be explained by other disciplines (Mäki, 2009). A 
traditional example of this is the division of labor that might exist between more micro disciplines 
such as psychology, focused on individuals, versus more macro disciplines, such as sociology, 
focused on social systems and collectives. More generally, this reflects the tendency among scholars 
to focus on the explanatory factors and initial conditions that by convention are considered 
appropriate within the particular discipline (Foss & Hallberg, 2016).  
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The notion that disciplinary domains play an important role for delineating explanations—and 
thus function as a means of dealing with the infinite regress problem—has manifest itself in various 
ways in strategy research. For example, Priem and Butler’s (2001) critique of the RBV highlights 
how the theory does not include a theory of value creation (i.e., consumer utility). Makadok and Coff 
(2002), in turn, defend the RBV by arguing that a theory of consumer utility could not reasonably be 
viewed as part of the explanatory domain of the RBV (or, more broadly, strategic management), but 
rather as the explanatory domain of marketing and consumer behavior. The question in this case then 
concerns whether a certain theory should be extended to include factors that have traditionally been 
viewed as part of neighboring fields or disciplines. As Makadok and Coff point out, “if we were to 
expand the RBV to encompass marketing, why stop there? Even in such an expanded version of 
RBV, there would still be important parameters and constructs that would be defined exogenously 
and taken as given” (2002, p. 12). The application domain oriented approach to infinite regress, then, 
prescribes a division of labor among researchers and theories based on dividing lines between 
different academic disciplines or fields where each theory is given “causal stopping points” and 
boundaries by academic convention. It may of course be argued that disciplinary stopping points are 
merely artificial and historical, and thus they perhaps should be questioned as they stand in the way 
of identifying the true cause or origin of something. However, there is arguably also value in having a 
multitude of fundamentally different and potentially irreconcilable explanatory perspectives (e.g., the 
perspective of the focal firm, the perspective of the industry, the perspective of the consumer). In 
addition to reducing the possibility for specialization among researchers, much of this richness might 
be lost if the aim was to always maximize reduction and unification to arrive at explanations at a 
supposedly more fundamental level of analysis (Mäki, 2009).   
But, instances of what we term the application domain approach to solving the infinite regress 
problem relate to our previous discussion of nth levels of (dynamic) capabilities. For example, Collis 
argues that it may be possible to sidestep problems of infinite regress by denying “the importance of 
capabilities by arguing that competitive advantage resides only in current possession of preferential 
product market positions” (1994, p. 149). In other words, perceived problems of infinite regress are 
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dependent on the particular theoretical perspective that is adopted and how disciplinary boundaries 
are formed in relation to theoretical perspectives. This “division of labor” among researchers suggests 
disciplinary-based stopping points that play an important role in addressing regress problems. For 
example, according to Winter, theoretical concepts in the capability literature, such as “routines,” are 
effective as long as they allow for particular forms of empirical prediction. This may be despite the 
inability of the “routine” concept to capture phenomena such as “the inner workings of a creative 
mind, or the subtleties of organizational politics at the highest level” (2011, p. 260). Such phenomena 
are then, in essence, said to be outside the application domain of capability theory and may instead be 
included in the application domain of other theories or disciplines.  
The problem with a focus on application domain. The problem faced by proponents of the 
application domain oriented approach to the infinite regress problem is related to the loss of 
explanatory power from not including potentially relevant “outside” (though perhaps highly 
important) factors in discipline-specific theories. After all, true, real, or even pragmatically useful 
causal stopping points do not necessarily correspond to conventional disciplinary boundaries. Hence, 
in situations where there are real and significant factors that are left unaccounted for because of 
perceived disciplinary boundaries, this might affect the precision and robustness of models. For 
example, related to the abovementioned debate on whether the RBV should include a theory of 
consumer utility, it has been argued that heterogeneous consumer preferences in fact do affect 
resource value and thus competitive advantage (Priem, 2007). Of course, this has led others to 
develop “demand”-based theories of strategy (e.g., Adner, 2002). Indeed, many of the extant debates 
about the nature of capabilities hinge on the issue of disciplinary boundaries (cf. Felin & Foss, 2011; 
Winter, 2012).  
The Real Origin Approach to Infinite Regress  
A third approach to the infinite regress problem associated with different conceptions of capabilities 
involves identifying what might be termed the true, fundamental or “real” origins of the phenomenon 
to be explained. There is of course likely to be much debate about what we can in fact call a real 
origin—why one thing rather than another constitutes a real origin (or why one thing, rather than 
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another, has a disproportionate affect on the development of capabilities). For example, in the social 
sciences, methodological individualists commonly argue that social phenomena should largely be 
explained at the level of the individual since social phenomena emerge through—or are constituted 
by—the aggregation and interaction of individual choices and behavior (Elster, 1989; Udehn, 2001). 
On the other hand, methodological collectivists typically argue that individual choice and behavior 
should be explained at the social, cultural or environmental level, since individual action, in most 
cases, is embedded in social structures, cultures and contexts that pre-date the individual’s existence, 
choice and behavior (cf. Barney & Felin, 2013). These types of a priori, theoretical commitments are 
especially pertinent since the standard scientific method does not test the realism of the assumptions 
that a theory relies on (Lam, 2010; Tsang, 2006).  
The real origins approach to the infinite regress problem consists of pointing to certain factors 
as being more foundational, reflecting a real initial condition and stopping point in the causal history 
of the explained phenomenon. For example, in response to scholars arguing that capability originates 
in evolutionary experience and repetition (Nelson & Winter, 1982), Felin and Foss (2011) argue that 
capability must have endogenous origins (i.e., residing, perhaps in latent form, within individuals) 
since experience and repetition cannot provide real initial conditions for capability without including 
some notion of the nature and heterogeneity of the individuals that are experiencing and repeating (cf. 
Anand et al., 2015). This argument may in turn be contrasted with the directly opposed argument that 
the real origin of capability must reside at the interfirm level since individual firms are too small to 
house all the necessary knowledge (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998), thus making networks, for example, 
the locus of knowledge (Kogut, 2000). 
The real origin approach is the most common way of addressing the infinite regress problem—
though often rhetorically—when explaining capabilities. While many papers do not address infinite 
regress problems per se, at least head-on, the real origin approach is typically invoked by focusing on 
a particular origin of capability—sometimes with associated control variables to account for 
alternative explanations. Proposed origins may involve historical antecedents, experiences, 
serendipity, idiosyncratic resources, luck, information, and managerial cognition (e.g., Ahuja & 
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Katila, 2004; Arend, 2015; Barney, 1986; Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003; Cockburn, Henderson, & 
Stern, 2000; Helfat & Lieberman, 2002; Maritan & Peteraf, 2011). But real origins also relate to the 
aforementioned issue of nth level regress. For example, both Winter (2003) and Arend (2015) propose 
that there are real stopping points in the nth level regress of (dynamic) capabilities based on the time 
and resources needed to build dynamic capabilities relative the number of times the capability can be 
used in a given time period. Others, such as Collis (1994) and Peteraf et al. (2013), have suggested 
that real stopping point in the nth order regress can be identified based on a contingency framework 
where the value of different (nth level) capabilities is dependent on the specific context (time and 
industry) in which the capability is deployed. For example, the real origin of capability might have to 
do with where one’s competitors are (relatively) in terms of a learning curve or the lifecycle or stage 
of a technology (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). 
The problem with real origins. The problem of the real origins approach is related to time and 
levels of analysis. Simply put, most social phenomena have antecedents, causal or not, which can be 
cumulative or composite in nature. Hence, claiming to have identified the real initial conditions for 
explaining a capability (or any phenomenon) is susceptible to the criticism that there undoubtedly are 
additional, unaccounted explanatory factors involved, specifically factors that pre-date the suggested 
explanation itself. In philosophy of science, this reflects the general notion that scientific knowledge 
is fallible and subject to revision upon further investigation (Lakatos, 1970; Popper, 1959). It is of 
course difficult—if not impossible—to exclude the possibility that more refined explanations, 
including a wholly different set of explanatory variables, might be identified. For example, while 
individuals might constitute an appealing causal stopping point for some in the social sciences, 
individuals can also be seen as products of social interaction and their environments.  
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
The true or real origin of capability (and other phenomena) may indeed be traced back historically to 
the big bang or some other, early cosmological event. While the identification of such ultimate 
origins could be interesting, we do not believe that this is a helpful place to start if the purpose is to 
address infinite regress problems in strategy management theory. In other words, we do not think it is 
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helpful to address infinite regress problems solely based on a notion that theories should be realistic 
and determinant (see Musgrave, 1981), or that they should cover the complete causal history of the 
studied phenomena (at all levels of analysis).6 That being said, we also believe that realism is an 
important long-term objective for management theorizing that needs to be balanced against other 
pragmatic and domain related considerations when defining the initial conditions and causal stopping 
points of theory. Thus, based on our discussion of infinite regress in the organizational capability 
literature, we next outline three research heuristics that summarize our main insights, particularly in 
terms of specific implications for future theory development related to organizational capabilities and 
strategy. These research heuristics suggest different pragmatic and domain related aspects of 
theorizing in management that we believe should be considered together with realism in order to 
avoid infinite regress problems.  
Initial conditions in management research should represent proximate and decision-oriented 
punctuating points. A natural starting point for addressing the pervasive infinite regress problem in 
management research is to focus on the decision-making associated with designing or building 
capabilities. A practical or pragmatic focus on how managers in fact might design and build 
capabilities represents a form of more proximate and “forward-looking” theorizing that attempts to 
offer actionable predictions of how capabilities are built—without placing the sole explanatory 
burden on long-run historical factors (e.g., serendipity, experience, history, path-dependence, 
structural inertia, etc.). Several contributions to capability theory that build strongly on evolutionary 
economic theory offer illustrative examples of this heuristic, particularly approaches that focus on 
luck (e.g., Denrell et al., 2003). That is, luck or serendipity-oriented approaches to capability, almost 
by definition, offer no forward-looking guidance about how organizations might develop a capability.  
Such theories are by their very design unable to generate predictions and in a meaningful way guide 
managerial decision-making, other than in the crudest of terms (e.g., suggesting that planning is 
useless given pervasive uncertainty). But such theories ultimately lead to an experiential regress, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 According to Kuhn (1998, p. 103), a good theory not only involves an accurate reflection of reality, but also 
predictive accuracy, logical consistency, broad scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness for new research findings.  
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somehow the “arrival” of the lucky needs to be addressed (Andriani & Cattani, 2016). These 
considerations are particularly important in a discipline such as strategic management that aims to 
provide practical implications for entrepreneurs, managers and policy makers. Certain forms of 
equilibrium analysis and game theory may provide one important tool towards this end (see Gans & 
Ryall, 2017). Another is the behavioral approach to management and strategic decision-making (see 
Gavetti, 2012; Powell et al., 2012). Of course, our call here isn’t for any kind of “rules for riches” 
(Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1994). But theories of capability can nonetheless feature practical 
advice for how to organize and design capabilities (see Adner & Helfat, 2003; Argyres et al., 2012; 
Castanias & Helfat, 2001).  
This shift is already happening in the literature, though it hasn’t explicitly been linked to the 
above issues related to infinite regress. For example, scholars have looked at the appropriate 
structures and designs that maximize decision-making, capability building and performance in 
organizations (e.g., Gulati, Puranam & Tushman, 2012; Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007; Zenger et al., 
2011). The opportunities to link decision-making and structure with the domain of capabilities 
provides a significant opportunity for future work, which naturally deals with some of the infinite 
regress issues outlined in this paper. Past studies on organizational structure (e.g., Foss, 2003) might 
indeed be reinterpreted as precisely the type of studies that explicate how managerial interventions in 
organization structure impact the emergence and development of capabilities.  
Another promising way for the field to address the infinite regress problem is to pay more 
attention to how economic decision-making or agency and history interact (Hallberg, 2015). For 
example, the “learning to contract” literature touches on both historical and decision-oriented aspects 
of capabilities (Argyres et al., 2012; Mayer & Argyres, 2004), where past contractual interactions 
provide a template or capability for future-oriented behavior. Thus the agentic and intentional aspects 
of capability can be brought to the fore. This has also been center stage in the literature on human 
capital and strategy (e.g., Campbell et al., 2012; Nickerson & Zenger, 2008). That is, capabilities can 
be closely linked to who is in the organization (cf. Felin & Foss, 2005), with special attention on the 
aggregate and emergent interactions of human capital in the realization of organizational capabilities. 
	   24 
Human capital of course might be seen as an instance of a more general opportunity where managers 
“purposefully create or modify a firm’s resource base”  (Helfat et al., 2007, p. 1), by making choices 
about the divestment or acquisition of particular individuals (Moliterno & Wiersema, 2007). Others 
have studied how capabilities involve the interplay between individuals who both create and capture 
value (Coff, 2010; Hallberg, 2017). These findings show that individuals matter for organizational 
capabilities (Campbell, Ganco, Franco, & Agarwal, 2010), though some settings appear to be more 
resilient to the mobility of individuals, even star performers (Groysberg, Lee, & Nanda, 2008). 
Initial conditions in management research should be distinctively different from the 
explanandum. In addition to the emphasis placed on realism and logical consistency in previous 
research on initial conditions (see Arend, 2015; Winter, 2003), we argue that addressing infinite 
regress problems also involves important tradeoffs where pragmatic and domain-related questions 
should play a major role. Specifically, in some cases it can be worth sacrificing descriptive realism 
(or even predictive accuracy) to gain a more useful specification of initial conditions. This can be 
done by stating initial conditions that are different or opposite from that which is to be explained (as 
discussed above: how hierarchies emerge out of markets in transaction cost economics). This allows 
the theory to more clearly specify how the dependent variable or outcome of interest emerges under a 
defined set of conditions, rather than simply assuming the prior existence of the variable of interest. 
This also provides clear implications concerning how managers can go about designing or building 
capabilities since the causal mechanism is clearly exposed. The opposite practice of simply predicting 
“more of the same” or “status quo” along a path-dependent trajectory does very little to highlight the 
specific ingredients (or recipe) that decision-makers need to pay attention to in order to take actions 
that may change the course of events in a deliberately chosen direction (cf. Winter, 2012). Our case 
study of regress problems in the capability literature provides several examples of this tendency in 
capability theory to focus on the history of organizations rather than on the choices that originated 
that history (e.g., Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003; Winter, 2003, etc.). Instead, to clearly explain the 
origins of something—like a capability—theorists need to ensure that the explanation actually tells us 
how, or under what conditions, capability emerges out of something else. In other words, it is 
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advisable for scholars to try to avoid “turtles-all-the-way-down”-type explanations where the actual 
reasons for the chosen behavior are left out of the explanation or their prior existence is simply 
assumed rather than explained (also see Vergne & Durand, 2010, 2011 for related discussion). While 
this requirement seems to be met, for example, in theories such as transaction cost economics (where 
hierarchy emerges out of non-hierarchy when asset specificity and additional conditions are present) 
and the RBV (heterogeneity emerges out of non-heterogeneity when causal ambiguity/asymmetric 
information and additional conditions are present), the capability literature continues to assume the 
very thing that needs to be explained by focusing on the historical and experiential origins of 
capability. 
One way to solve the infinite regress problem of simply assuming the pre-existence of 
explanatory variables (such as capabilities) is to think about how these variables can somehow be 
“grown” through theoretical and empirical analysis. This intuition comes from those who have called 
for a “generative” approach to social science (cf. Cederman, 2005), which readily can be applied to 
explaining capabilities as well. The central insight is that explanation ought to be equivalent to trying 
to grow something. This is aptly captured by Epstein’s quip: “if you didn’t grow it, you didn’t explain 
it” (2007, p. 8). In other words, if we don’t understand the underlying initial conditions, constituent 
elements, their interactions, enabling mechanisms and structures, then we are unlikely to be able to 
offer an account of how to grow or build something. This admittedly is a modeling-oriented 
conception of the scientific enterprise, conducive to theory building through, for example, agent-
based simulation. However, we think it provides a helpful way of solving some of the sticky 
quandaries associated with infinite regress, and can serve as the basis for developing more forward-
looking and decision-oriented theories of capability, strategy and management.  
Initial conditions in management research should match the unique explanatory aim of the 
theory in question. The explanatory aim of theories should be given greater weight in the 
specification of initial conditions. Naturally, when explaining firms’ long-term survival and 
adaptation (e.g., Nelson & Winter, 1982; Hannan & Freeman, 1977, etc.) theorists face a different 
type of challenge than when the explanatory aim is to predict sustained performance variation and 
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competitive advantage (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1984; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982, etc.). This domain-related 
difference between theories in terms of explanatory aims and explanandum should be carefully 
considered when specifying initial conditions. Differences in explanatory aims are of specific 
importance in management research because the discipline draws heavily on a number of very 
different source disciplines (e.g., economics, sociology, psychology, etc.), which themselves have 
very different explanatory aims and assumptions (Foss & Hallberg, 2016). For example, typical 
assumptions from evolutionary economics related to path-dependence and structural inertia—which 
might be effective for modeling how a population of organizations develops over an extended time 
period—may not be suitable for the quite different explanatory aim of understanding the choices of 
entrepreneurs and managers as they develop and seek to grow organizational capabilities in the short 
term.7 Hence, in the case of capability theory, there is presently a mismatch between the initial 
conditions derived from evolutionary economics (which in turn is inspired by evolutionary theory in 
biology, and focused on variation-selection-retention at the level of populations) and the explanatory 
aim of management scholars and practitioners to arrive at explanatory factors that are economically 
relevant (for particular organizations, rather than populations) and at least in principle under 
managerial control.  
Here we might apply the evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr’s (1961) simple framework of 
proximate versus ultimate causes of explanation. Naturally there are many long-run, population-level 
explanations of the survival of species, perhaps providing the “ultimate” explanation—and it is this 
intuition that in fact has shaped capabilities research as well (Winter, 2012). But the more proximate, 
developmental and organization-specific factors (cf. Felin, 2012)—a kin to our idea of the “growth” 
of capabilities, discussed above—are perhaps more important to management scholars. It is these 
proximate causes that are more actionable for managers, and they also don’t lead to the type of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Another example concerns how the RBV has drawn extensively from economics despite having quite different 
explanatory aims (Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1991). Theories that explain the emergence of market equilibria 
may benefit from a different specification of initial conditions than theories that aim to explain the dynamics 
and emergence of organizational novelty, heterogeneity, and competitive advantage. This may explain why 
strategy scholars have gradually distanced themselves from core economics concepts such opportunity cost and 
equilibrium (e.g., Lippman & Rumelt, 2003). 
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reductio ad absurdum suggested by the infinite regress problem. In sum, taking disciplinary divides 
into account when defining initial conditions might be an important vehicle for making the reasons 
behind these tradeoffs clearer, as illustrated by the widespread application of evolutionary economic 
theory to the context of capability theory. And this in turn might influence how academic debates 
develop, what gets priority in those debates, and ultimately what direction theory development takes.  
CONCLUSION 
In this essay we have highlighted how various forms of the infinite regress problem manifest 
themselves in strategy and management research. We have used the capability literature as our 
example. Past work has primarily focused on the nth order regress problem (e.g., Collis, 1994; Winter, 
2003). But we also outline two additional forms of infinite regress: experiential regress and 
hierarchical regress. Based on the case of infinite regress in organizational capabilities, we identify 
three different approaches that can be used by researchers to address these problems: a pragmatic 
approach, an application domain approach, and a real origin approach. We find that a more detailed 
evaluation of the different forms that infinite regress can take (nth level, experiential, hierarchical) and 
the possible approaches to dealing with them can be useful for highlighting less acknowledged, but 
desirable, properties of theory in strategy research. First, scholars should to a greater extent seek to 
balance the pursuit of realism in explanation against other desirable theoretical properties that allow 
for testable, novel and counterintuitive predictions that may serve as a foundation for explaining 
organizational decision-making and behavior. Second, management scholars should build theories 
with clearly stated initial conditions that are distinctly different from what the theory seeks to explain, 
rather than merely assuming the pre-existence of these concepts. As we have discussed above, this 
property of theorizing might raise productive, future-oriented questions, particularly in the case of 
some contemporary theories that suffer from an overreliance on underspecified causal mechanisms 
such as structural inertia and path-dependence (see Vergne & Durand, 2010, 2011). Third, the 
particular explanatory aim and practical relevance of theories should be given greater weight in the 
specification of initial conditions and the matching of a particular type of infinite regress problems to 
its relevant solution.  
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In sum, we make three related contributions: First, we identify the problematic properties of the 
initial conditions stated in capability theory (path-dependence, serendipity, experience, history) and 
show how these properties may lead to different forms of infinite regress. Second, we develop a more 
nuanced understanding of the infinite regress problem in strategy by arguing that this problem should 
not, as assumed in much of the previous literature, only be addressed in terms of identifying the real 
origins of capability, but that it should also take into account pragmatic considerations and the 
intended application domain of the theory. And finally, we contribute with concrete research 
heuristics or steps for avoiding infinite regress problems in the specification of initial conditions. Our 
hope is that this essay leads scholars to more carefully consider the problem of infinite regress in their 
own theoretical and empirical work. And more importantly, we hope that this essay offers productive 
ways for dealing with the infinite regress issue—not just in the context of understanding 
organizational capabilities, but also more broadly in the context of strategy and management research. 
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